

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FOR
A WELFARE STATE





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FOREWORD

THE four public lectures published in this volume were delivered by Dr. Appleby, during his fourth visit to India, this time as a Visiting Professor at the Indian School of Public Administration from December 19, 1961. In these lectures Dr. Appleby gives an illuminating and thought-provoking analysis of some of the contemporary basic administrative issues in a Welfare State. As in his previous writings, they reveal a deep insight into the realities of administrative life in the broader context of its political and social setting. His approach is pragmatic; and the basic theme is the development of human competence and responsiveness within the individual citizen, the administrator, the politician, the different sectors of the society and the society as a whole.

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More specifically, in these lectures, Dr. Appleby refutes the general belief that dependence is encouraged by welfare programmes, and feels that there cannot be "any dependence so alarming as .

that which results from an absence of the welfare state and what it signifies". He also explains the supremacy of the political element over the administrative, as "*everybody's* business takes precedence over *anybody's* business in a democracy". While the sub-division of an organisation into parts is more an administrative rather than political phenomenon, "*manner* and *spirit* of the division of labour and the manner and spirit in which the work so organised is carried on are different in democratic governments from the same matters in non-democratic society".

In another lecture Dr. Appleby's analysis helps to dispel the common notion that administrative decisions in the context of a planned economy can be finally determined, within a given framework, by economic and other 'expert' advice. All decisions by non-political administrators, he emphasises, eventually involve human judgement and contain a political element (though without involving the civil servants in party partisanship); there is nothing like a decision which is administratively correct for all times and situations, because the final sanction of the decision lies in accountability and responsiveness to the popularly elected representatives.

The need for generalists, to co-ordinate and integrate the work of specialists and to make over-all judgements, also grows as specialisation within government increases.

Another point which he stresses is that, while development of personnel holds the key to effective administration it is equally important to adapt the organisational structures to new demands of development. Structures should be intentionally designed to identify and pose issues as well as to resolve them. And Ministers need more and variety of staff aides to supplement the advice flowing upward to them through the administrative hierarchy. Finally the basic qualities of a good administrator are listed by him in some detail; the main emphasis here again is on development of competence, responsibility, action-mindedness, and social skills to work with the people.

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As Dr. Appleby says, good administrators and politicians are rare birds; I may be permitted to add that even more rare are the insights and administrative wisdom portrayed in the pages


which follow. I am sure that Dr. Appleby's lectures will be read with equal interest and profit by all who are concerned with the problems of public administration whether in India or abroad.

V.K.N. MENON
Director

*Indian Institute of
Public Administration
New Delhi, August 3, 1961*

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I

INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE AND THE WELFARE STATE

WHEN human society was in its earlier phases it was a progressive step to establish a privileged class. The pursuit of daily subsistence was so demanding that little advancement could have been hoped for except by making it possible for a few to be freed for tasks of a higher order. These tasks were recognized, dimly perhaps, as important to all. This fact, and only this fact, made such duties of a higher order. Thus by a small levy on the relatively many a very small minority could be put in position to assume responsibility for leadership—decision-making, experimentation and reflection.

The very first welfare programme was of this sort. There was no justification for privilege except as it redounded to the advantage of the less privileged, and the method worked even though not in every case or always with the same degree of effectiveness. Conferring advantages on some did, as a general thing, equip them

better and enable them to guide their people in primitive advances along the path of civilization.

If their special advantages had not been special advantages, if hardships and extreme deprivation had been the only sound preparation for leadership, leadership from the unaided masses would have been eternally—every second generation or so—overthrowing the leadership that had attained any marked privilege and so become “soft”, “dependent”, “profligate” and “degenerate”. The result would have been to maintain society for ever at practically a dead-level condition approximating savagery.

For all its crudity and unfairness, the primeval welfare effort worked well enough in the long run, and in enough places, to develop productive capacity and so to advance learning as to make more advantages possible for larger and larger shares of the peoples so organized and situated. The demonstration of feasibility in various societies has now stimulated a worldwide aspiration towards the great spreading of the distribution of advantages.

The aspiring masses can no more form and manage the new kind of society than the rank and file of primitive men could themselves provide leadership for the slow advance to where

we find ourselves now. It is the responsibility of those now presuming to lead in any country to use their special capacities so as to fulfil the mass aspiration. The mass hope must be reasonably realized or they will do what the mass always can do—end a regime, give followership to another, or in complete frustration, substitute disorder for order to the great damage of everybody.

What present leaders need to do is to find how to accomplish most, most rapidly, with least waste and least failures. Only the objective is entirely clear: the accumulation of advantages and their spread to citizens generally, thus maximizing the development and utilization of human potentialities.

Before committing ourselves to precise methods there should be profit in examining critically two sets of dogmas which often serve as substitutes for thought about welfare programme.

One of these sets is comprised of a series of fears that invite hostility to welfare state commitments. The second is a series of doctrines often assumed to be the essentials to success. In the first set of dogmas are many familiar prejudices that serve as counsels of defeat for the welfare

state programme. I shall discuss only three:

(1) *Ability is very rare, directly inherited from persons already constituting a "leadership class".*

This position includes belief that to encourage the rank and file to greater achievement will only frustrate them and society itself. In another form it insists that incompetence is inherited. Two generations ago, before much of anything was actually known of genetics, much was made in my country of the "Jukeses and Edwardses". The Jukes family lived in direst poverty with little chance to improve its lot, and data were compiled to show how many were guilty of theft or other crime and how uniformly underprivileged they continued to be in successive generations. The descendants of the famous colonial clergyman Jonathan Edwards, however, were shown in contrast to be exceptionally successful and reputable.

Even as a boy I used to wonder how many Edwardses had gone wrong and been disowned, their family membership obliterated, how many Jukeses might have broken out of the bounds of their family membership, changed their names and attained respectability. Later on, much firmer ground for attacking the earlier belief was developed. We know now that much of the good

inheritance that goes with membership in a reputable and responsible family is a *social* inheritance, a result of example and stimulation rather than genes. We know now that family and class have little meaning in long-time, general terms. Their meaning is more personal and immediate. We also know now that the so-called I.Q. as established by intelligence tests is not a simple reflection of a fixed and inherited intelligence but may be and often is sharply increased by care and stimulation or diminished by ill-treatment and drudgery.

We know now, too, that very many children born of parents who are both feeble-minded but adopted at birth by normal adults are themselves of normal intelligence while a very large percentage of just such children when institutionalized are feeble-minded. Even Havelock Ellis' *Study of British Genius* written about seventy years ago found virtue in diversity of inheritance lines rather than in its monopolization in a fixed class.

In short, we know, as a result of modern biological, psychological, sociological and genetic learning that the potentiality of human kind is spread wide through humanity.

(2) *Everybody must earn everything for himself if*

it is to do him any good. This familiar discouragement of compassion and encouragement of selfishness and social blindness is sheer nonsense.

No one can ever actually earn the milk that nurtured him in infancy, his mother's care, his father's and mother's labours to support him and provide him with health and education. No one can earn the books written through a millennium or more, the stores of learning accumulated, the buildings, the institutions, the works of art. On the mountain slopes of northern Italy are successive terraces a few feet wide, flattened out by long, hard labour in bygone generations, supported by rocks piled carefully one upon another. The grape-lands thus produced cannot be sold on the market for enough to equal a fair price for the labour that went into their building but there they are—adding to the riches of life today for many who have no sense of knowledge or obligation to those whose labours there were exerted and who supplied with their own sweat the first water for the irrigation of those terraces.

Who here in India can assert that he has "earned" Gandhi or Nehru? Who in my country can claim to have "earned" Washington or

Lincoln or Roosevelt?

Advantages *are* advantages, and we may receive many of them freely and gratefully at the hands of others. Even more can be done than has been done if we learn more about how to make efforts to be helpful more effective. Heretofore, too many advantages have been heaped upon those already in the privileged classes, through higher tariffs and through increased subsidies to ship-owners, railway builders, and airlines, and by permitting organized monopolies, price-fixing and other forms of exploitation of the masses.

(3) *Dependence is encouraged by welfare programmes*: Have the industrialists subsidized by tariffs lost any independence, aggressiveness or ambition? It seems to me that they are as energetic and active as ever, and actually strengthened in their private positions and in hostility to the very government that has contributed to their strength. Indeed, I think this is the natural consequence. An ancient political anecdote current in the United States involves a conversation between two politicians. One had reported to the other that a certain constituent of the latter was spreading bitter criticism of him. The politician being criticised mused aloud: "I can't understand why he does this. I don't recall

doing anything for him recently."

At all events, I think persons who are inclined to accept this dogma about dependence being encouraged by welfare activities should do some fresh thinking about dependence. I can't imagine them discovering any dependence so alarming as that which results from an absence of the welfare state and what it signifies.

Consider the dependence of the poor illiterate man on the private employer who—in his ability to hire and fire—literally holds almost total power over the welfare of the man and his family. The man for whom alternate employment is not readily available is the most abjectly dependent of persons, fear-ridden, submitting to unresisted abuse and denied dignity. The man who sees the children of others getting education, superior food, and the best possible medical care while his own are undernourished, ill and with little chance at a decent education—that man has reason to question his own manhood and to be overwhelmed by realization of his own dependence as he grovels before the arrogant and privileged. Dependence of the underprivileged, it seems to me, is clearly a product of private unconcern about or the inability of private leadership to grapple successfully with

the problem of inordinate mass dependence on private persons. Only united action through the one common instrumentality of government can maximize and hasten the development of strength and competence among the masses. *Action through democratic government is, in an important and valid sense, self-help, since the government has no means with which to be helpful except those which are produced by the people.*

In the intellectual world we have found that every advance of learning, while in a sense solving "problems" at the same time reveals new problems—ignorances not earlier recognizable. So in the social world every additional privilege presents personal challenges theretofore so irrelevant or invisible as to have been for all practical purposes non-existent. The educated man must struggle hard to provide for his children the richer education which in their generation will be comparable to the education he had for his generation. The depth and breadth of education are forever increasingly extensive. New knowledge reveals new things to be done about health which can be done only with difficulty. Community life has richer and richer possibilities. In other words, the beneficiary of welfare programmes is stimulated by them to try

to keep up with the continuing march of civilization. Difficulty extends ahead keeping pace with him. He has no need to be required to carry an unnecessary heavy rock half-way up the mountain of tomorrow so that when half-way up he can throw it away and thereby be rested and so able to reach the top. There is, in fact, no top; the climb is continuous, the need and opportunity for individual initiative forever expanding, not contracting, if only there be such freedom and sharing of responsibility as is provided by political democracy and good administration.

The central feature of good administration is its development of all members of an institution. The only way that the burdens of leadership in advancing civilization can be made manageable is by enhancing the capacity and utilizing the knowledge and judgement of all subordinates. This is the welfare state aspiration expressed in administrative terms.

Civilization is achieved by two main means. One is *specialization* whereby individuals develop special skills, knowledge and capacities. We see this exemplified in the sciences, where among a thousand physicists or a thousand chemists no two will be equally acquainted with various

sub-fields of specialization in their respective sciences and each one will have a unique status and role because of his particular experience, interests and assignments. In primitive society, some excelled as warriors, some as hunters, some as fishermen, and in each function individuals varied somewhat, but the number and scope of functions was limited. Today the general categories of jobs number tens or hundreds of thousands, while sub-categories are many times as numerous, and each one of successive incumbents in a single post will handle its responsibilities in his own peculiar way. The scope of individuality actually is enormously widened in this way even though while superficial appearances may seem to standardize us. And being aware of our special individual we constantly seek ways to make it significant to others. This is the essence of individual initiative. The opportunity to earn a living is sublimated into a way of self-development and self-expression.

The second main means of achieving and advancing civilization is the use of these diverse individuals in specialized institutions. This is organization and administration in their highest significance.

How much more individual initiative there-

is for persons when they are not browbeaten and yelled at given "orders" and expected to act literally in accord with instructions! Good administration chiefly encourages, applauds, stimulates and mediates. It is obvious that this method is most likely to be present when the pursuit of the general welfare is dominant.

Turning more particularly to the questions of method, it first should be observed that no doctrine or slogan provides the answers. To rely upon socialism (regarded as involving public ownership of enterprise) is no more a sufficient programme than to rely upon *laissez faire* capitalism. Some public ownership is desirable for particular reasons in particular situations, but not as a matter of general principle, and not total public ownership. Some private ownership is desirable in particular reasons, for particular situations, but certainly not everything should be privately owned. Ownership, indeed, is becoming increasingly a matter of indifference. The pilot on a private airplane operating on a private airline in the U.S.A. may be under closer governmental direction than a pilot of a governmental plane on a governmentally owned airline in another country. So too, in the case of the company owning the airline.

In so far as "socialism" now stands for the "welfare state" it is a highly laudable dedication. But so dedicated, how one moves in each particular situation in each particular country involves problems of organization, administration and technique. The requirements are not doctrinaire as to means, but pragmatic. Here out of my own observation and experience I can only offer a few illustrative guide-lines.

First of all, I suggest that there is need to learn much more about the forms and application of incentives. The ancient capitalist notion that it is necessary to have rewards range from starvation to millions a year was sheer ignorance. In Britain during the war, with taxes limiting income to a maximum limit of about \$25,000 a year and with a hundred per cent excess profits tax, energies were put forth more than ever before. The national survival incentive called forth all the individual initiative of which the nation was capable. Another illustration is provided by the case of a personal friend who owned individually one of the great meat-packing industrial concerns in the United States. Speaking to me in the late nineteen-thirties he said: "I can spend only about 30 per cent of what I make, and I can spend that much .

only by authorizing other persons to spend for me. One doesn't get much feeling of spending by doing it through agents. *If I had been born at a time when I could have made only 10 per cent as much I make now, I would have worked just as hard."*

Smaller monetary incentives can be effective, in other words, under drastically changed conditions in the society when other concerns loom large, or they can be effective when they become customary.

It is also true that incentive is provided by non-monetary factors. Eminence among his fellow industrialists was of great importance to my meat-packer friend. Demonstration of his ability to succeed, to compete successfully, was important to him. Recognition of personal dignity and importance is a compelling incentive for everyone—eminent or lowly, and the lowliest employee of any worthy organization is important if the establishment is well administered. Even if the institution is poorly run and affords him no real place meriting his pride, he remains important to his family and to his society. Just such persons can make or break a society. It is the responsibility of leadership to give them a chance to *make* it. This is the central incentive.

Many skills are being developed modernly that facilitate the development of subordinate capacities. If there is not enough individual initiative it is because leadership has not helped open sufficient opportunity for it.

Even in private business in democratic societies there are many modern practices which make men able to contribute importantly when without administrative help they would fail. I once knew a man, for example, who made thirteen successive attempts to carry on a grocery business. Each time he failed, although he was honest, hard-working and well-liked. He did not have capital enough or he extended credit too readily, or in some way he proved not able to keep up with his competitors. Thirteen attempts certainly demonstrated his initiative, however. The last time he failed a great chain-grocery company took over his store and made him their local manager. By the guidance they gave him they enabled him to succeed. The company had hundreds of stores but this man came to be rated as one of the best of their managers.

It costs money to hire and train people. It costs money to have a too heavy turnover in personnel, and businesses have found that by spen-

ding more for in-service training and stimulation more people succeed and the employing companies succeed more thoroughly.

Oil companies give guidance to private owners of petrol stations who are the customers of the oil companies. Motor car manufacturers study the conduct of the private garage businesses of those who sell their automobiles. They give advice about size of inventory of parts, kinds of equipment appropriate to particular volumes of business, man-hour costs, book-keeping systems and other such things. Many companies nowadays send especially promising executives for special academic training sometimes not at all directly related to the business, because they find that broadly informed and thoughtful employees are more useful to them than stale and narrow ones.

All these things come under the heading of "good business" for enlightened modern business. Why is it not good business for enlightened society to do the equivalent in the many areas business cannot cover?

That it *is* good business I have seen demonstrated in literally thousands of cases I have had opportunity personally to observe. Every social worker I have ever known has been engaged

precisely in this kind of effort—trying to help families to succeed as families, trying to help children develop into competent, useful adults, trying to rehabilitate the handicapped, trying to inspire hope in the hopeless. This is what every good teacher is trying to do to build human competence. This is what public health is for—to free people from the limitations imposed by ill-health and physical crippling.

One of my own favourite welfare programmes in the United States in the years following the Great Depression was that of the Farm Security Administration. That agency was set up to help the many farm people who were more needy than those who were sufficiently aided through low-interest loans. The Farm Security Administration made both grants and loans in relatively small amounts and supplemented them with attentive and imaginative as well as technically sound advice in home and farm management by a woman and a man “supervisor” for each two hundred or so aided families. I visited hundreds of these “clients” in all parts of the United States and was immensely impressed by the almost uniformly successful results. About 85 per cent of the loans were repaid while standards of living of the aided families were raised from

100 to 300 per cent and capital or personal property assets were increased at about the same rate.

I shall mention only one particular case because of the general guidance it offers for such undertakings. The local Farm Security Administration supervisor and I were driving along a country road when the supervisor slowed the car and said, "See that man walking about a hundred yards ahead? He is one of our clients who worries me. He turned sour as soon as we made him a loan. I want to talk to him." As the car stopped beside the farmer he turned and recognized the "supervisor". The man's face lighted up with eager welcome. "I am so glad you came by", he said. "You know, ever since you loaned me that \$300 I have been worried almost sick. I couldn't see how I could ever pay back \$300. But now I think I can see that it's going to work out, and I wanted you to know."

That client had "turned sour" because he took his responsibility seriously, and because the aid had been tailored to do what was necessary to his economic advancement and yet was just within the limits of his capacity at that time. These are points central to the administration of welfare programmes. Education in schools and

education through administrative guidance then help the individual to extend the bounds of his capacity as his financial resources and experience grow.

It is out of experience and observation, then, that I summarize a few guides to welfare administration.

(a) Make dimensions of aid for a particular person fit and yet stretch his capacities of that stage in his development.

(b) Design benefits so that as quickly as possible they appear to be a matter of right rather than a matter of benevolence, just as the son of a millionaire inherits unearned millions or as a child takes the advantages of schooling without any question.

(c) Time benefits so that they do minimum violence to prevailing sentiments and customs and yet contain truly dynamic impulses. (We have compulsory education to the age of 16 for almost all youngsters in the United States, and we have come to it rapidly, yet in successive steps not very seriously questioned by very many persons.)

(d) Seek to achieve balance in advantages. When the occasional son of a millionaire develops into a wastrel play-boy it is not because his father

had money but because he was not given other balancing advantages—deep family affection, careful and understanding guidance, stimulation and sense of responsibility, or good health.

It is true, of course, that there will be a percentage of failures among poor people as there is among the privileged, and it is true that each generation is confined to a degree by the example, resources, outlook and customs of the environing older generation. Particular individuals are especially handicapped by the shortcomings and backgrounds of their own parents and neighbours—just as other individuals are, in effect, especially subsidized by the stimulating conditions, attainments and examples of *their* parents and their neighbours. This retarding influence on the advancement of the great mass of people may seem to compel a very slow rate of social progress. Yet a vast range from primitive under-privilege to widespread privilege has been covered in some societies in the 160 years between the year 1 and the year 1961.

Those 160 years represent only 28 successive, overlapping life-spans of about 70 years each. Viewed in such terms, the progress has been very rapid. As a four-time visitor to India I am convinced that there is nowhere a more poten-

tially competent general citizenry than there is here. The frank dedication to the Welfare State ideal in the Indian Constitution is therefore fully warranted in theory, experience elsewhere, and capacity here.

The danger in India is not that too much welfare will be achieved too rapidly, thus undermining responsibility. The danger is that difficulties will too readily bring discouragement, that old work-ways and old thought-ways will be too stubbornly confining and that not enough will be done rapidly enough.

II

THE POLITICIAN AND THE ADMINISTRATOR

IN a democracy, *everybody's* business quite properly takes precedence over *anybody's* business. This is confusing, because *anybody* knows *anybody's* business and *nobody* can really understand *everybody's* business.

Democratic government gives consideration to anybody, but defers most to everybody. The process of giving consideration to anybody and letting the balance fall in favour of everybody is not carried on with mirrors—or with calculating machines. It is carried on through politics and political institutions. It involves heart-aches as well as head-aches for all who share in governmental responsibility.

The title of this discussion may seem to imply that the politician and the administrator are two quite sharply different kinds of people engaged in quite different kinds of work. This is not quite the case.

Every governmental employee is engaged in

political work. Government and politics are synonymous, although not identical, terms. They are not identical because some very important political activities are carried on outside government proper—in parties and in many other citizen affairs directed towards influencing the conduct of government. Most government employees in modern democracies have little to do directly with *partisan* politics, and career personnel often tend, erroneously, to think parties a bad thing. But in the sense that politics has to do with making government generally acceptable through the interplay of multiple interests, ideas and ideals in relationship to governmental courses of action, even very lowly employees of government have at least an indirect part in it—collecting information, watching for unhappy phrases in written or oral communication, greeting callers, expediting or retarding action. In India, for example, the conduct of clerks in post offices certainly affects public judgement about the government more than a considerable number of speeches by ministers.

The higher one goes in government, the greater is the involvement in politics because of involvement in greater public concerns. Very, very rarely is anyone in a modern democracy

below the level of deputy minister directly involved in *party* politics, however. This is what is meant when it is said that the civil service is not political or even when it is said that it makes no policy. Everybody in the government participates in policy making, but policy of a kind parties choose to become specifically concerned about is made rather rarely and rather exclusively at ministerial levels and above. There is a gray zone where the difference is a shaded one, a matter of subtle differences in manner and in emphasized subordination of the civil servant to the minister, the government, and the Parliament. The citizen can and should look for accountability only to these political levels frankly associated with party. For ministers are responsible for *all* political actions, whether partisan or not. Their first concern is to make government actions be of a sort that will be popularly acceptable. Civil servants in narrower terms share in that very responsibility.

The difference between the politician—one who is publicly associated with party responsibility as well as with governmental responsibility—and the civil service administrator exists primarily in the party tie of the former. Both are engaged in governmental work, and there-

fore in politics. Both—when the politician is a minister, sub-minister or equivalent—are administrators. Both also are in these circumstances officials in the basic sense of that term—being formally vested with governmental responsibility. The politician, in addition, has party responsibility. This is the prime difference between them.

Another difference, or perhaps a somewhat different aspect of the same difference, is in the level of responsibility. The normal pattern of difference between one level in an executive hierarchy and the next higher level in that hierarchy is broken at the apex of the civil service where that service ends and the ministerial level comes in. At this point there is a change in *kind of responsibility* from rather strictly intra-organizational responsibility to party and wider public responsibility. This differentiates and elevates the ministerial level more than the normal distance between two hierarchical levels of the civil service. Between the ministers and the Prime Minister, or as in the system in the United States between Department Heads and President, there is another especially wide gap.

The acutely progressive concentration and combination of intra-governmental and public re-

sponsibility at these high points makes the differences. But the ministers, the Prime Minister, the Department Heads and the President all have *administrative* jobs of the very highest order. It is an order difficult for civil servants to understand. Their background is inadequate for the purpose of providing much understanding of it. Similarly, it is often hard for ministers to understand the work-ways and attitudes of the civil servants. This is especially true of newer ministers. In the long run, because the broad comprehends the narrow but the narrow does not similarly comprehend the broad, able ministers tend to understand the civil service pretty well, in terms of ministerial needs, but civil servants in this particular matter tend rather to endure and accommodate their ministers, than to understand them and their enormously important functions. Ministers have to be elected to office and be publicly responsible for governmental actions. Civil servants have heavy responsibilities of course, but they don't have to be *elected*.

It is to this problem of an improved understanding by civil servants (and academicians perhaps) of the intrinsics of *political administration* that I wish to address myself here.

Perhaps I should indicate my own limited qualifications for the task I am assuming. I have never run for public office of any kind, although I have had a chance to see that this is the most certain and comprehensive way to increase one's understanding of one's government and of democracy. Nor have I sustained any long-continuing public activity of other kinds in partisan politics. Continued work for party is the second-best way I know of to learn about one's government. (I have been acquainted with ward and precinct party workers who could not verbalize their understanding but who demonstrated quite extraordinary functional understanding of government by working smoothly with all levels and many functions of it.) As a newspaperman I have worked on the fringe of partisan politics, however, and as a government employee of semi-cabinet status I have been for perhaps seventeen years a kind of middle-man between career administrators and politicians. It is out of reflections in such vantage points that I speak.

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First of all, let me say that in all the hierar-

chiefs I have ever observed very few at any particular level of responsibility seemed to understand very well the responsibilities and the needs of the executive next higher. No more than a relative handful of all the people I have known have ever been able to be very understanding of the needs and responsibilities of persons two or more levels higher than they are.

Subordinates tend to want to make higher ranking executives over in their own subordinate images. Many of them think it almost criminal that their "boss" should attempt to appraise their own work when the boss has not had the same training and the same experience. Subordinates generally feel that top administrators should know everything the subordinates know.

This is an absurd but wholly natural feeling. It is not equally natural for the subordinate to be aware of the value of his superior's broader exposure to society, his acquaintance with other functions and other social drives than those to which the subordinate's energies are addressed. Nor is it equally natural to appreciate the resource the immediate "boss" has in seeing something of the situations and concerns in which the *boss's boss* is involved.

As an administrator I saw subordinate employ-

ees sometimes making decisions in terms they thought the Congress would approve, or that the President would approve, or that the Secretary of Agriculture would approve—and these were all poor decisions which their superiors did not in fact uphold. These subordinates were in no position to guess what the Congress, the President, or the Secretary would do. What any subordinate should do is to exercise his own best judgement with as much regard as possible for the broader responsibilities of his *immediate superior*, and then to accept with some equanimity such modifications or reversals as his higher superiors may require.

I used to rely upon various techniques for securing acceptance of my judgement on those occasions when I found it necessary not to accept recommendations of subordinates. Two examples may illustrate the problem as it is faced by ministers.

In one instance I would arrange to have a confrontation in my office of the recommending official and one of equal importance who opposed the proposal made to me. This would not convince him of error but would emphasize the fact that there were difficulties in my way. He then might return to his own subordinates and

say, "I think Appleby actually agreed with us but I could see that he would have a lot of trouble with the Bureau of Marketing if he did what we asked, so I told him we would withdraw our proposal for the present". (Ministers cannot actually in the same way confront civil servants with political leaders and citizens who, he has reason to believe, will not like what the civil servant proposes to do.)

In another instance the head of the Estimates Division in the Bureau of the Budget might come to me with a group of his principal executives to propose that I go to see Dean Acheson—then Under Secretary of State—and persuade him to get the State Department to agree to one of the Estimates Division's recommendations. They had encountered heavy opposition, which they thought could be readily overcome if I used my influence on Acheson, my warm friend. As I listened, I concluded that the recommendation of the Estimates Division was a rather pedestrian one of questionable importance and wisdom which would not interest Acheson. I told the group I would give their request consideration, and some hours later I called back the head of the Estimates Division alone. Then I asked him whether, if he occupied my desk, he

would go to Acheson about this particular matter. I remember him going to a window and looking out while he reflected about my situation. After a few minutes he turned around, came back to my desk, and said, "No—I would want to wait, and take up more important matters with him." So he, too, withdrew his earlier recommendation and told his subordinates he had done so.

This is about as far as it is possible to go to get subordinates to think usefully in terms of higher responsibilities and these devices work well only within the formal ministry and with especially able subordinates. Hence it is not surprising that civil servants find it hard to understand the ministers who are thinking about social and institutional forces the civil servant has not really experienced.

It explains why civil servants generally felt that Franklin Roosevelt was a "poor administrator" while I thought he was a supremely able one *in terms of the requirements of the Presidential office*. He got an enormous amount of things done, many of them novel things, with high public acceptance even though at a cost of some bitter enmities. He got things done that needed to be done—well and honourably done, with great dedication on the part of subordinates

and with great value to ordinary citizens. In my mind all these things add up to a most favourable administrative record. He—and any other president or head of government I have known—would not have been at all outstanding as a civil service administrator. Let us not try to make our political leaders over in a civil service image or any other irrelevant image. Let us try, rather to understand better those who can go to the heights of political leadership; they go in relatively long jumps and they deal in the stuff of whole societies.

The more democratic a government is, the more thoroughly political it is. The Kremlin is no stranger to politics but it is involved more distinctly in "palace politics"—politics within an inner circle—than in something immediately influenced or subject to quick influence by many millions. In a democracy more selfish interests, more ideas, ideologies and ideals of more people must be more constantly taken into account than in a government not systematically accountable to a whole people. The weighing of unlike, inconsistent, competitive, unrelated and complementary concerns is the continuing business of democratic government. It is political business. The great weight of it is borne by the poli-

ticians, who in effect protect the civil servants from the full impact of politics.

There is no non-political authority which can validly decree for democratic government just how much various values should weigh in terms of each other and in terms of different days and years. There is no science that can tell us whether it is more desirable to put an additional ten crores of rupees into health research or education, into nutrition of the children of the poor or care of the blind, or into new paper mills or new steel plants. There is no science that gives sure and simple guidance in the handling of religious cults and linguistic groups. There is only judgement, and the appropriate judgement must be developed out of the whole of life on behalf of the whole people, not merely for the special pleaders.

Education is important in a democracy, yet education itself helps more to *reveal* problems than to provide quick and clear solutions for them. As an eminent social scientist has remarked of his own profession, "It is not the function of the social sciences or the social scientists to solve the problems of the decision-makers; it is their function to complicate the task of the decision-makers by providing new insights to

be taken into account."

Decision-making becomes more and more complicated as civilization advances. It is an art.

Even in science, decision-making is an art, not a science. The choice of a field of inquiry and of ways to pursue it can be well made only as a result of non-scientific learning. In social administration the factors involved in choices veer toward the innumerable and the unidentifiable. Knowledge of these factors can never be complete, and in any case, knowledge is not at all the same thing as wisdom. Nor is your wisdom or my wisdom equal to social wisdom. In public matters much of the determining stuff of judgment must derive from society itself if we mean what we say when we talk about democracy.

Society can be led, taught, and persuaded, of course. A great deal depends upon leadership. But leadership can exercise discretion on behalf of a people only when it draws a large part of its wisdom from the society, when it is ever and acutely sensitive to the society, and when the society can hold the leadership accountable.

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With the dominance of truly popular politics

established, politics and the operating organizations engaged in decision-making are two basic instrumentalities through which governmental business is conducted. The term "politics" is intended here to cover all kinds of personal and group interchanges having a direct bearing upon government. Of all such phenomena, the most crucially significant are those of party, to which all other political efforts are peripheral and incidental. There is not time to include in the present discussion a general treatment of political parties, but I should like to say in passing that I agree with Professor Stephen K. Bailey about the importance of parties when he asserts that they do more to insure freedom and democracy than constitution can do. This is in line with the importance I attach to the party responsibility of ministers, which civil servants do not have.

The second basic instrumentality of government is, as already indicated, the formal institutional structure of its operating entities. In this discussion conducted under the auspices of the Institute of Public Administration, I shall confine my attention to those entities, commonly denominated "executive" or "administrative" although at least some of the things I shall say

are applicable to all governmental organs.

An executive bureaucracy is characterized by two primary forms of division of labour. First of all, any kind of complicated assignment can be made manageable by dividing it into parts in a manner I shall call "lateral". By this I mean to indicate that the whole task is divided into roughly equal parts which are assigned to persons who may be said to have approximately equal responsibilities and are thus, organizationally speaking, equals or "on the same level". Secondly, each of these portions of the whole task is divided into parts for purposes of supervision and co-ordination. These assignments differentiate responsibility in a way commonly regarded as "vertical" and indicating differences in rank.

I often wish that the idea of rank could be entirely discarded because of the way in which it is inflated, misunderstood and projected into relationships where differences in responsibility either do not exist or have a quite different pattern. But the capacity of one person to direct other persons must be recognized for the purposes of achieving team-work, synchronizing efforts and maximizing quantity and quality of output.

Perhaps the beginning of wisdom in this matter is a wider realization of the fact that "authority goes with the function". Thus the operator of a lift may properly refuse to permit a top executive to enter when it is already loaded to its safe capacity. Or in an army officers' mess where officers wash their own dishes—and there are some of this kind, I am happy to say—a non-commissioned man properly gives directions to a colonel who doesn't know the procedure.

In any case, the organization of work into parts and the assignment of different responsibilities are of the essence of administration. The divisions of labour thus effected result in more and more specialization of functions, which in turn frequently results in wholly new occupations. Some of these attain the dignity of professions and lead to the establishment of new academic training programmes. I recall, for example, when realization of a wasteful exploitation of soil resulted in bringing soil scientists, agricultural engineers, agronomists, geographers, and foresters together into the conduct of soil conservation programmes, and this in turn resulted in agricultural colleges developing programmes for the training of professional "soil conservationists", in which elements of all these

fields were combined.

This division of large undertakings into parts is characteristic of such undertakings in all societies. It is not of itself particularly significant to democracy and is not usually a direct product of political influence. It is, in other words, more an "administrative" than a "political" phenomenon. However, *manner* and *spirit* of the division of labour and the manner and spirit in which the work so organized is carried on are different in democratic governments from the same matters in non-democratic society. This is so because responsibility in the former is to the whole public. These matters of manner and spirit are important in their bearing on the attainment and development of democracy, and by this token important to politicians. Let us try to identify some of these things.

First of all, of course, come those features of form and process which enable governmental programmes to be kept harmonious with popular needs and aspirations, and make it possible for the public to oust or install particular leaderships. Popular election of those who are to be vested with immediate control of government as representatives of the citizens at large is the basic essential. This means putting politicians

on top, enabling them in fact to be the very top administrators and thereby to make *everybody's* business take precedence over *anybody's* business. It means creating controls so that the work that has been divided into parts will not go off tangentially in all directions in accord with the special concerns of officials with special responsibilities. Work divided into parts for the sake of manageability *can* become unmanageable.

A second main device is to keep the bureaucracy itself—and not only the Parliament—representative. This is not done by having civil servants elected by citizen constituencies. It is done by recruiting persons of diverse backgrounds geographically, educationally, culturally and functionally. It is done by arranging the bureaucracy in ways which cause these different kinds of individual equipment to illumine each other, to compete with each other, to cause issues to be formulated and considered, and to make possible the solution of these issues, at least in the sense of maintaining a dynamic balance within the government and within the society.

Except for a party, no one, no function, no interest, no department or institution of government should ever win a complete victory, or

anything really close to an "overwhelming" victory. Democracy is that form of government in which everyone influences—or is capable of influencing—everything a little bit, but not capable of influencing any public matter very much. (The party's function of organizing a majority position alone can be one of decisive victory because its search for a majority entails a continuing concern for the minorities who can constitute a majority.)

"Autonomy" thus is a word fundamentally inimical to democracy. I once received from the Chairman of the sociology department in a University at which I had previously delivered a lecture a copy of a memorandum he had written. Its theme was that "No one but a sociologist has a right to determine anything about the conduct of a sociology department". Under this logic it would follow—giving other functions similar autonomy—that "sociologists have no right to determine anything outside of sociology departments". Actually, under that logic there never would have been any "sociology departments". The very word "department" implies a higher agency having allocated—subject to control by the allocating authority—certain

of its general functions to a particular sub-structure.

So it is that democracy is the kind of government in which sociologists, farmers, physicians, business men, old, young, male and female, religious and irreligious, educated and uneducated, tall and short, fat and thin, pugnacious and conciliatory have a chance to exert influence; consequently it is government where all vested with the special responsibilities of governance must work under close scrutiny, subject to popular eviction, and under the necessity of deferring to everybody. Democracy, in other words, is of all governments the kind that operates through the most numerous, extensive and variegated interactions. These are interactions of many persons, groups, places, functions, responsibilities, facts, ideas, beliefs, ideals and hopes. The results are bound to be more sensible than logical, and characterized by considerable inconsistency.

Involvements in these interactions is the common business of civil service administrators and political administrators. Their functions have a resemblance, but they differ in scope.

The civil service administrator has forever to stimulate, develop, guide, rely upon, uphold,

criticise, and umpire differences among his subordinates. He must similarly consider what his subordinates are doing that offend, compete with or impinge upon work done by subordinates of his civil servant peers. One writer on administration has said somewhat whimsically that what one oversees in the actions of subordinates is *administration* whereas the account he must take of the responsibilities of his peers, and the account he hopes to persuade them to take of *his* responsibilities, is *co-ordination*. In every case these differences in concerns complicate the task for civil servants or politicians or both. Their job is to achieve actions more acceptable to all concerned than otherwise would have been the case, such actions no one in a completely untrammelled position would have taken in just the same way, and therefore they are actions not wholly satisfactory to anyone.

Within the institutions of government, as well as in the relationship between citizens and government, there is essentially government by consent rather than government by consensus.

What is true for the civil servant is even more thoroughly and insistently true for the political administrator. What is complicated for the civil servant is enormously more complicated for the

politicians, who must take account of *everybody's* concerns—outside the bureaucracy as well as inside it, and more insistently outside than inside. The government does not exist for the civil servant. The civil servant exists for the sake of the government, and the government exists for the sake of the people. The politician is the special, formal embodiment of that popular dedication. While civil servants of many degrees also work with citizens and are obliged to seek acceptance by citizens, their activities are specialized and their dealings with citizens are limited in number and scope. Politicians in contrast are held responsible to *all* citizens for everything the government does. The politician in dealing with the civil servant consequently has the advantage of knowing about citizen reactions to more different phases of the government than any single civil servant or departmental bureaucracy can have acquaintance with. The civil servants have a quite different resource in knowing more about their particular programme than the politicians do.

Actually, of course, no single individual—politician or civil servant—can be aware of every citizen and all citizen reactions to all governmental activities in all their technical aspects

and in their total application all over the nation. *Many* civil servants in dealing with each other represent a much more thorough acquaintance with their total programme and with those public groups most affected by them than any *single* civil servant can have. Similarly, *many* politicians dealing with many of their fellows in party councils, in legislative bodies, cabinets and ministries, dealing also with a good many civil servants and dealing with many citizens concerning many governmental problems and programmes, know collectively a vast amount concerning the country, its political temper and its reaction to things the government has done, things it is doing, and things it is contemplating.

It is out of extensive interactions of bureaucracies, political administrators, political leaders and citizens that there is distilled a pragmatic learning, a wisdom applicable to nation-wide activities appropriate and acceptable to the society. Out of the whole comes something no individual could provide.

In final analysis, then, we see the citizen, citizen groups, political parties, political leaders, civil servants as technicians and administrators, and workers of many kinds—all these as comple-

mentary elements, interdependent features, of the organic whole which is democratic government. It is to the whole that we are indebted if we are well served. And only through all the parts fusing themselves into a whole can we be well served. That is the process of administration in its broadest and most significant meaning.

The vesting of overall responsibility in politicians—ministers and Parliament—makes that responsibility popularly identifiable and popularly accountable. This is a basic peculiarity of democracy. To argue for placing a determining power in the hands of economists, academicians, “administrators” or any others with specialized or expert equipment—“authorities” in their fields—is to argue for authoritarianism. Portugal affords an example precisely in point currently, but who really believes it to be exemplary?

To those weaklings who prefer to shift all their burdens of discretion to some strong figure whom they will blindly adore, I have nothing to say. To those too exclusively and parochially preoccupied with some special function or some special clique or class and who therefore seek to impose their special point of view on everybody else—the conscious or unconscious authoritarians—I can say nothing persuasive. But to

those who have respect for mankind at large and wish fully to engage human potentialities I can summarize my meaning in three paragraphs:

The hallmark of democracy is dominance of government by politicians popularly oriented, chosen and accountable, and those skilled in popular politics are inevitably and desirably amateurs in everything else.

Politicians, like other folk, range in quality from excellent to able, to good, to poor, to very poor or terrible. I think their average quality in any well established democracy I know is far above the average quality of their respective peoples—a fact that reflects favourably on the peoples. For the great majority of politicians, experience with public responsibility has been ennobling. And all of the revered and transcendent figures in the history of democratic nations have been politicians.

Government betterment is not to be had by throwing out the politicians. It can be achieved by substituting high-grade politicians for inferior ones.

III

THE GENERALIST AND THE SPECIALIST IN ADMINISTRATION

EVERYONE in the world is unique in fingerprints, in important organic features, and in experience. Psychologists verified decades ago as environmental in source many differences in attitudes and personalities among children of the same family brought up in what had been presumed to be practically identical circumstances. That no one is exactly duplicated makes every person have some of the values that attach to rarity. Individuality gives one place in society. It is a proper occasion for pride and dignity. At the same time this means that anyone and everyone is limited in point of view and experience. Because he is what he is, he can speak only within very narrow and tentative terms on behalf of mankind in general.

✓ The advance of civilization is a long march in the direction of further differentiating people, making all persons more and more unlike each other in knowledge, background, concerns,

and skills. Primitive peoples have only a few dozen kinds of skills and small cultural inheritances. They and their customs change very, very slowly. Change in highly advanced societies goes on at faster and faster speeds in more and more directions.

I attended a college where, still actively teaching, was the professor who taught the first "political science" courses offered anywhere in the world. In my lifetime and a few decades more, political science has developed specialized fields within itself: political theory; constitutional and administrative law; municipal government; state-government; politics; comparative government; international relations; public administration. These fields of political science are now themselves broken into sub-fields. There are specialists in particular foreign governments, in international law, in comparative public administration, in international organizations, in public purchasing, in public authorities, in police administration, in natural resources management, in urban and rural zoning, and in many other sub-fields and sub-sub-fields. Very few now would claim to be "generalist" political-scientists, and any one would readily confess vast ignorance about the

areas occupied by professional colleagues.

The price of specialization of every kind is parochialism. To be especially informed about anything is not to be similarly informed about everything else. A way of looking at problems is an infinite number of ways of *not* looking at them.

Civilization marches onward in the first instance as people specialize their efforts and thereby learn things and contribute to the doing of things otherwise not possible. At the same time, as one's knowledge increases in a specialized way, by study or situation and assignment, one's general ignorance increases disproportionately. This *could* result in such confusion as to stop the advance of civilization and cause its devolution. Unless we can make all of our specialized learnings, functions and interests harmonize in the sense of being at least mutually tolerable and many of them actually complementary, the march of civilization will become a descent into chaos.

Making civilization possible—maintaining social order in the face of more and more differentiated preoccupations—is the supreme responsibility of government. Government's instruments are politics and public administration

in the broadest possible meaning of the latter term.

There are, and can be at this stage of history, no individuals who can be described as being even approximately true "generalists". Even philosophers are nowadays specialized into schools and fields, and most of them are not themselves philosophers; they are only familiar with certain philosophical literature. In any case, the synthesis which is to be achieved in an an-going society is dependent on actionists rather than on professional intellectuals. In many cases the professional intellectual, indeed, is so unlike the body of people who comprise the workaday world as to be peculiarly disqualified for political and quasi-political leadership.

But if there are no true generalists, there still are and always will be persons who are relatively more of the generalist sort than the vast majority of their contemporaries. Then, too, it is possible to organize and carry on institutions especially designed and staffed to achieve general ends.

Government is the primary, indispensable institution capable of maintaining an advancing state of balance in a condition of advancing complexity. It is charged with the extraordi-

nary function of making *general* sense out of a dynamic proliferation of special occupations and preoccupations. There are some social illiterates who vociferously call for "minimum government" without realizing that they are advocating minimum civilization.

Neither the synthesising role of government nor the synthesising process is much understood. Too many think of government as properly having to do with "order" conceived in terms of avoiding violence. The pursuit of order does, indeed, involve capacity to deal with incipient riots, rebellion and international warfare. But it always has also involved order as between diverse interests and concerns of divisive character short of immediately violent import. As civilization advances, these features of society grow in much the same proportion as that illustrated by the translation of slings and catapults into hydrogen bombs and space stations.

Government as an ordering institution, in terms both of violence and of social synthesis of a much more subtle sort, is most familiar to the general public in verbiage related to constitutional structures. Nations which are quite different from each other in actual processes and in the values they serve sometimes have

quite similar constitutions, and acquaintance with constitutions therefore provides little understanding of government. Yet there are at least a few persons in any particular democratic country who are justified in feeling that they understand its basic structures.

In the United States, for example, the general roles of the Congress, the President and the Supreme Court are consistent enough and familiar enough so that very many citizens tend to feel that they understand their government in terms of these three main organs. Hence once the point is made that all three deal not merely with present and potential violence but with order in terms of an expanding complexity in things known, things being done, occupations, interests and aspirations, the way in which general policy decisions are made on a basis of Congressional and Presidential consideration is readily perceived. The interaction of Congressional committee members coming from all parts of the nation, individually embodying differences in experience and responsibility, is rather vivid. The interaction of these legislators with the constituents who elected them and who can return them to private life is readily assumed. The relatively specialized concerns of the commit-

tee originally considering a measure are seen as influenced by other committees or they are modified also by awareness of the need to secure concurrence of the other House and by thought of the possibility of Presidential veto and judicial review.

It is not hard to see that this process of interaction is, in small, such like a nation-wide process of interaction between the whole body of voters. It is like it, yet more manageable and more illumined by special access to relevant information. And in the end, even though not completely satisfactory to any citizen, it is usually acceptable to all citizens, just as while not just what any member of Congress or any member of the Executive branch would most like, it is as acceptable to them all as any feasible alternative would be.

It is nothing less than amazing how often it is true that this governmental product *is* generally acceptable. Whereas general consensus would be almost never possible on matters of such complexity and import, *consent* is almost invariable. When consent is not evident, the government modifies its course. But the cries of outrage are about things believed to be contemplated, not about things actually done.

In important part this is true because of refinements achieved in the application of statutes by administrative organs. This constant decision making, operating phase of government is not at all well understood popularly.

The bureaucracy has its own representational characteristics, its own synthesising roles. Persons from all parts of the country, with highly varied professional and occupational responsibilities in scores of agencies with hundreds of bureaus having thousands of divisions with tens of thousands of smaller units, impinge upon one another, competing, deferring, influencing each other and adjusting actions in terms of citizen demands and complaints.

The whole result is a highly important contribution to social co-ordination. It is a synthesising, generalizing product of interaction between specialists in agencies with specialized responsibilities. In a good many cases it may be very little more than this. But even these cases are developed under the discipline of persons and bodies having positively generalist abilities and clearly general responsibilities. These persons and bodies are the frankly political ones, at least potentially partisan. There would be no syn-

thesis of a kind appropriate to popular government without them.

In spite of the fact that training and work assignments specialize the members of the bureaucracy, and that any individual politician is also to some extent a specialist in responsibility to one party, a specialist in geographical tourliarity, and a specialist in terms of his own background and personality, some persons lend themselves more readily than others to generalist roles. Persons differ in degree of specialization in outlook, differ in degree of capacity to deal in relationships between specialized functions, knowledge and concerns. "Specialist" and "generalist" are relative—not absolute—terms.

No one is a complete specialist, wholly unable to have any perception or any sympathy for other persons and for considerations not really his own. And of course no one is equally interested, informed and understanding with reference to everybody and everything.

But people in general are certainly very much more specialist than generalist in outlook, and in recent decades there has been a growing faith in "experts". There has also been an increased tendency on the part of experts in many fields

to assume or assert some special right to dominate public policy in areas of their own *expertise*. There has been, similarly, a general failure to recognize that the importance of generalizing competence in persons and in institutions has gone up in a geometrical ratio as specialization has proliferated in a rapid arithmetical ratio. The familiar dictum is increasingly true : "The expert should be on *tap* not on *top*."

We should direct more attention to the fact that a Prime Minister needs to be more competent as a generalist, less competent as a specialist, than his ministerial colleagues. Similarly, more attention should be paid to the facts that all ministers have roles of more generalist sort than any civil servant has, and that the need for generalist qualities and performance rises at each upward level in the bureaucratic hierarchy. There should also be more recognition of the need ministers have for generalist-type aides.

No matter how specialized in training and interest a civil servant administrator may have been initially, each promotion upward constitutes a vesting in him of successively larger responsibilities for enforcing the general point of view of his minister and his government. The higher he goes, the wider the scope of per-

sonnel and functions subordinate to him, the more crucial is his function as administrative agent of a still higher authority.

There is in this phenomenon of hierarchal responsibility a certain ambivalence. The executive represents his subordinates to a degree and up to the point where he has transformed their views so as to relate them to the broader context within his purview and has so put those he accepts before his own superior. When higher authority promulgates a decision, it becomes his duty to support that higher authority, to interpret its decision to his subordinates and effect their willing and understanding implementation of it. One incapable of this ambivalence is an incapable administrator.

It is generally true that the more thoroughly professionalized a function is, the less administrative competence will be exhibited, and the more constant will be a stubborn parochialism. Most scientists, engineers and medical doctors, for example, tend to remain emotionally champions of their respective professions, no matter how much their elevated hierarchical positions may require of a general responsibility exercised in broader terms. It is this stubborn allegiance to specialism that is at the root of most perfor-

mances called "bureaucratic" in the invidious sense of that word.

The higher one goes, the less particularly relevant is *any* kind of earlier, special orientation. Some highly trained professional persons who have become distinguished administrators have discovered this. A friend once asked the head of governmental research in the United Kingdom how valuable he thought his training in science had come to be for him, in his high administrative post. The administrator answered quickly out of prior reflection, "It gives me nothing in my present position except a readier acceptance of me by my subordinates."

I once attended a conference in the U.S. Office of Naval Research participated in by heads of all the naval laboratories. Triggered by some remark by a professional educator, each laboratory head rose in succession to assert that his university training had no particular bearing on his current and recent tasks.

In a lecture to principal executives of the U.S. Public Health Service I once sought to provoke illuminating discussion by saying something like this : "All of the professional staff of this service are either medical doctors or engineers. All of the service-wide administrators are medi-

cal doctors. Yet if being a medical doctor qualifies anyone to be head of the Public Health Service we might just as well put all the names of the medical doctors in a hat and select as head of the Service any man whose name we draw from it. You know, and I know, that this wouldn't do. I suggest that if a medical doctor makes a good head of the service he does it *in spite* of being medically trained, rather than because of it." To my surprise, I started no argument at all. Everyone who commented expressed agreement. In any case, the Ministers to whom the heads of the Public Health Service have been responsible would all have agreed, and their point of view is more valid than that of the medical specialists. The Public Health Service does not exist for the sake of the doctors but for the sake of the public, and the politicians as a body are the only appropriate judges of who can best serve the general interest in any particular post of general responsibility.

Ministers and heads of government, of course, are the crucial politicians who should serve with least justification attaching to expert competence. We frequently err in this respect in the United States—not because Presidents do not know better, but because the halo of *expertise*

is politically more potent with us than it should be. We therefore tend to put farm spokesmen in the position of Secretary of Agriculture, labour spokesmen in the position of Secretary of Labour, bankers in the Secretary of the Treasury post, and business men in the position of Secretary of Commerce. This is one reason why we have too few able politicians with experience qualifying them for consideration as possible Presidential nominees.

In Britain they do better in this matter. Their method is one that puts politicians in domestic political posts and gives long and varied political experience to an impressive number of persons.

The point is that even any top civil service position requires so much of political competence (in a nonpartisan sense), requires so much of generalist capabilities, that any man in such a post who thinks of himself as an expert is already at a position higher than any he is properly fitted to fill. At that level he should be—and should think himself to be—primarily an administrator and a public servant.

In this particular matter India seems to be at a stage which we in the United States were beginning to leave several decades ago, even

though (or possibly because) in these same decades we have carried the phenomenon of specialization further in more directions than any other society.

In the nineteen-twenties all American hospitals were administered by doctors—and in numerous and important respects very poorly administered as a rule. Today there is a large and respected body of hospital administrators without medical degrees, and the administration of hospitals has been greatly improved. Non-medical administrative officers also now hold high place in national and state public health services although not yet so extensively as in private services.

Similarly, in the nineteen-twenties there was a considerable fad for engineers as administrators. Public ignorance of one sort had combined with professional ignorance of another sort to confer or to claim for "engineer" as for "doctor" more sweeping significance than the terms actually signify. In that period most of the city managerships then being established were filled with engineers. The climax of this movement was the election of an engineer—Herbert Hoover—as President of the United States. We hear almost nothing of engineers

as administrators, nowadays. The great majority of the city managers of today were not trained as engineers. Urban redevelopment administrators, who in recent years have come to head up multimillion-dollar reconstruction programmes in our most progressive cities, are not usually engineers. They hire engineering firms to do engineering work, and *everybody* is happier that way. The man here who insists that only engineers can administer programmes importantly involving engineering technology only betrays his own failure to understand administration.

There is no one "right" source for an administrator because of some technical character in the activities to be directed. Whatever the programme is, it involves vastly more than any one kind of training or experience may be counted upon to provide. Nor is it an iron law of administration that promotion should always be made by elevating someone already within the particular organization. A good high level administrator is always a *rare bird* and such rare birds are developed from many different sources.

A really good cadre of administrators in any large organization will consequently represent a great variety of backgrounds, and some will

have been brought in at high levels from outside. The president of one of the world's great mercantile organizations told me that they always were on the lookout for a good executive wherever they could find him. They continually experimented with likely prospects from other fields and sometimes bought another company just to obtain an executive they could not otherwise hire. This company's intelligent practices were not so exceptional as many laymen and specialist claimants would be inclined to believe. Diversity of background on the part of an administering cadre makes for vitality and competence. Diversity of experience on the part of single administrators is often also a feature common to the preparation of many of the ablest ones. Yet this consideration provides little more basis for an iron law of selection than does professional membership. Good top administrators are rare birds.

There is another way in which the general point may be made. This is in terms of the problem of communication. The more an expert specializes in some aspect of some function or subject-matter the *lower* is his actual position in the hierarchy of that function or subject-matter, whereas his unique achievement may confer

upon him *higher* and higher repute. The consequence is, speaking illustratively, that a specialist so differentiated from his own professional colleagues that even *they* find difficulty in understanding what he is saying may be the very one who tries to communicate with the Prime Minister or President about his field of work. This can only frustrate both the specialist and the President or Prime Minister. A very great deal of the organizational frustration of professional people—scientists in particular—derives from this misguided kind of effort at communication.

I think it might be demonstrated that no expert *as an expert* should ever try to communicate with anyone responsible for general policy. Rather there should be efforts to develop will-filled-in hierarchies of specialists in the principal areas of specialism with persons in the upper levels of such hierarchies being more expert in exposition than in the particular subject and function being described and explained. One trouble is that experts don't like that position and the role it involves, since thereby they lose the eminence of uniqueness: in specialization and particular achievement and are charged with being "superficial". They may lose face with

the general public and—more often, more certainly, and more devastatingly in terms of professional pride—they lose face with their professional colleagues. And yet an occasional C.P. Snow illustrates the possibilities.

Another illustration of less general applicability is provided by a story I am assured is true about the problem of communication between physicists engaged in one part of the Manhattan Project out of which came the atomic bomb. The story is that these physicists had so specialized in sub-sub-fields of physics that they did not understand each other. It was essential that they communicate, and therefore an English Professor was brought in, charged with talking successively to the physicists until he could serve as an interpreter.

Because of this problem of communicating about and synthesising in action more and more things, facts, functions, people, interests and aspirations, changes in political and administrative arrangements will be required from time to time in all nations and between nations.

In this country, for example, some structural changes within ministries and between the national and State Governments may be rather soon required.

I do not know, of course, just what changes may be most useful here, or when they should be instituted. But by referring to the experience of my own country, I may be able to illustrate the process of administrative development. All these have to do with elevating consideration of the general interest over what Jefferson called "local egoisms" and what now are also "specialist egoisms".

First of all, of course, has been the rather fortuitous emergence of a two-party system to serve as the continuing instrument of majority government.

Secondly, there has been a long and continuing clarification of the dominance of the nation over the states. Climaxed unmistakably in the Civil War, the national power has been exercised with moderate persistence to enforce racial equality in reluctant communities.

Thirdly, there has been a great growth in delegation, thus keeping the way clear for political leaders in administrative posts to handle more and more important matters by developing and utilizing the capacities of subordinates. Both the President and the Secretary of State gave personal attention to every patent issued in the Washington administration, for example.

Now patents are better handled four or five or more levels lower in the administrative hierarchy.

Fourth, the development of a civil service has been gradually supplemented with a system of personal aides around ministers and civil service administrators.

Fifth, rather more consciously than in earlier periods, administrative structures have been designed to be competitive in the first instance, coordinative in the second instance. In other words, structures are now somewhat intentionally *designed to identify and pose issues*, as well as to resolve them.

Developments of the third, fourth and fifth kinds just listed have been intended *to improve the bureaucracy's service to Ministers*.

One of the important gains sought is that of providing ministers with more varied subordinate viewpoints—giving them more chance to understand what the issues are, and what alternative action possibilities there can be.

There is here, I think, too much tendency to advise ministers through a single kind of channel from subordinates. Too few issues are presented to him from within the ministry; he

hears about issues too exclusively from disturbed citizens.

If proponents of several viewpoints derived from differentiated responsibilities have, and use, free access to the minister, they will give him perspective, which is the essential basis for judgement. In successive cases they will also give him a fairly clear picture of his ministry and how it operates, the points of view dominant in it, and how much it is achieving. All this will be enhanced if he learns how to ask all concerned more and more searching questions.

The general point is that the staff of a ministry should be structured somewhat more to maintain open channels for competitive viewpoints.

It is as much a Secretary's duty to *advise* the Minister according to *his own* judgement in the first instance as it is to carry out the Minister's judgement when that judgement has been definitely expressed. Too often in my country and in India alike those who serve Ministers recommend the action toward which they guess their Minister to be inclined. Too often they do not argue when a decision is being considered.

Secretaries should be valued on these principal points : (1) Frank and independent advice

in the first instance; (2) facilitation of opportunities for others to get before the Minister views different from those of the Secretaries; (3) careful maintenance in all important matters of written records showing clearly who recommended what and what decisions were made. (It should be remarked here that too many decisions are made only in conversation with no proper written record; too many "notes" accompanying papers are devoid of any real content.) A fourth important basis for evaluating a secretary is his success in building competence and confidence in subordinate staff. Improvement in the top structure and in the performance of Secretaries is one thing; their displacement by specialists would be to go in the opposite direction.

VV

An auxiliary point, already suggested, requires explanation. It is that personal staff of high competence and status should be provided for ministers and for civil service administrators at an increasing number of hierarchical levels.

9-P

Staff facilities available to the President of the United States outside of Civil Service personnel have been made vivid to newspaper readers in the weeks just preceding and following the inauguration of President John F.

Kennedy. On a smaller scale, staff of a similar sort is a resource of the heads of departments and agencies. At the Presidential level, staff authorization comes from Congress, often simply in Appropriation Acts but sometimes in special statutes. At the Cabinet and Agency level concurrence in the *number* of places open to non-civil service appointment is usually a prerogative of the Civil Service Commission. But in all these it is properly believed that the identity of persons chosen is wholly for the Minister or Agency Head to determine. If the practice should be attempted here it might be more acceptable and safer, for a few years, for the Public Service Commission to have the power of vetoing—but not nominating—such appointees.

At the ministerial level, the purpose would be to provide him assistance in using civil servants, enabling him to obtain information consciously couched in terms appropriate to the ministers' special responsibilities. A personal secretary or two cannot begin to give adequate service. Alone as a politician in his ministry, a minister and a deputy minister normally cannot learn nearly enough fast enough.

At the level of civil Servant administrators, the need is to help the civil servants formulate

materials in terms of more *institutional* wisdom and less in terms of merely personal wisdom than now is the case.

I can illustrate this matter by pointing again to experience in the United States. In the ministry of Agriculture there the minister used to have occasions when he wanted in relation to some special problem the distilled wisdom of, let us say, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The request for advice would go to the Chief of that Bureau, whose personal secretary would pass it on to a Division Head whose personal secretary would pass it on to a Section Head, who would assign the matter to a single economist. The economist would write an anonymous individual view of the subject in question. It would be transmitted through the Section Head to the Division Head, thence to the Bureau Chief, and finally to the minister who would find in it as a rule nothing clearly helpful or even relevant to his original query. It did not reflect the wisdom of the Bureau as a whole. These were all intelligent persons, but they were not staffed to serve their minister well. Since then, the development of personal staff around ministers, bureau chiefs, division heads and section heads has become rather a common-


place resource of great value.

Beyond such devices, of course, is the problem of having civil service administrators who are truly actionists. There is a tendency, born of frustration, to turn to experts for high administrative posts because the civil servants are not selected enough and trained enough in terms of ability to lead institutional action programmes. There is a related tendency to over-intellectualize administration at the expense of workaday-world effectiveness. Both tendencies I think are in the wrong direction.

The potent focus of concern I am convinced, is to provide ministers with better institutional resources. Instead, the subordinate functional specialists and the experts wish somehow to compel him to take *their* judgement. The responsibility is to equip him to make for himself the best judgement of which he is capable in terms of his higher, broader responsibilities.

The problem is one of the greatest magnitude, with the dimensions of feasible civilization at stake. The expert is at the core of the forward movement. Yet if his point of view becomes dominant the bounds of civilization will prove tragically confined. We must find ways to make general sense out of things. We must have more

persons committing themselves to more general functions and concerns. Then society can achieve through its institutions a kind and degree of wisdom unattainable by individuals however much they dedicate themselves to generalist performance.



IV

THE GOOD ADMINISTRATOR

So many different functions have to be administered in so many different situations in an advanced society that it is extremely difficult to speak usefully about qualities generally characterizing "good administrators". In a particular individual some one quality may be so marked as to offset the lack of some other desirable attribute. The relative importance of various qualities will vary with the institutional situation, too. For example, a man who gets along with modest abilities in a long-established organization may fail dismally in a new position in a new organization. Contrasting a good military commander in the field with a good chief of staff in the national capital further illustrates the varieties of administrative species.

Admitting the wide range of variables, some more or less generally requisite qualities may be identified. Out of a dozen such attributes, an effective administrator might usually be expected to have some admixture of an assortment of seven or so. To see all twelve in one per-

son would be to see someone more than a good administrator—a superman, or a man long dead. In actual practice, individual shortcomings can be overcome in large organizations by constituting administrative *teams* with members whose qualities complement each other.

Some qualifications not peculiar to administration must be assumed to begin with. Without basic character, other attributes are insufficient. The good administrator has a high loyalty to his institution, involving a willingness to yield a good deal of himself to its discipline. Aside from the self-interest of income, in public administration there is a special opportunity for a sense of dedication with altruistic and idealistic significance. There are also loyalties to particular programmes, functions and professions. Sometimes satisfaction of sense of craftsmanship in institutional performance is an important feature of emotional motivation.

After character and motivation more strictly administrative capacities are to be considered:

(1) The most crucial single qualification of this sort is, I think willingness to assume responsibility. In the case of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Cabinet members—the administrators with party as well as public responsibili-

ties—I am inclined to put the requirement as something *more* than *willingness* to carry heavy responsibilities. These persons who must campaign publicly, be popularly elected and publicly accountable need to have a special zest for public life and public responsibilities; perhaps—“positive eagerness for public responsibility” is the phrase I seek. To want it too much is a weakness that leads to personal deterioration, but not to want it positively is a weakness that reflects inherent incapacity for this peculiarly public role. For professional civil servants simple willingness to accept responsibilities is probably best; it reflects sober self-confidence that avoids the pitfalls of an inflated ambition. Yet this willingness must include courage, a readiness to take risks, a dynamic attitude, not simply an ability to play things safe or to attend to details. Mere tidying things up (“house-keeping” it has been called) is not administration. The fact that it is less easy for me to recall really good administrators among civil servants in the United States than to recall good ones who were political appointees probably has its chief explanation in this very distinction concerning courage and a dynamic attitude.

Willingness to take responsibility is much

rarer than most people are inclined to believe. The greater are the responsibilities of a position the fewer are those who would actually wish to fill it. Many would like the higher income the more responsible position often yields. Many would like the status thought to be associated with the position. Many would like the recognition of merit that accompanies promotion, and would dislike being passed over in favour of someone else. These things often cause persons to seek positions they would for every other reason prefer not to have. Such attitudes are indicative of administrative incapacity. Their frequency also probably reflects some malformation in our systems of compensation and recognition, since there surely are many important and worthy functions besides those of administrative character.

For the purpose of our present discussion, however, the point is that those who are most likely to carry responsibilities effectively are those who do not run from them and yet know that responsibilities are heavy. They are the ones who know administration to be full of troubles and yet find it challenging and rewarding in itself.

(2) Perhaps the second basic attribute of a good

administrator springs naturally from the first. It is demonstrated growing power—a steadily enlarging ability to deal with more problems, more varied problems and more diverse people. President Woodrow Wilson is often quoted as having said that “all who come to Washington either grow or swell.” If only those were brought to Washington who had unbroken records of personal growth and no records of personal swelling, the Washington performance would be a much more completely gratifying one than it has been in the past. Growing capacity is more subject to identification than practice has generally demonstrated, even though there are no fool-proof guides. And growing capacity in subordinates can be nurtured by good administrators.

An ability to capitalize largely on relatively slight experience is of the essence of growing power. Some people become more and more preoccupied with and confined by their particular experiences, while others are caused by particular experience to gain insights in other directions than those actually traversed. Those of the second sort have a certain capacity for generalizing what they see and do, without becoming dogmatic or too prone to verbalize

their learning too glibly. This characteristic may be described as a worldly-wide, actionist form of what in more cloistered and verbalizing individuals becomes, or closely resembles, philosophy.

(3) As this discussion has by now suggested, a good administrator is one with a strong bent toward action. He has discovered the importance of excellence, and will often be highly reflective, but is one with a sense of urgency, one who keeps his eye on deadlines and on his personal responsibility for action; he is one who is likely to feel that his thinking is a by-product of his involvement in action. His mind may be of a quality and type unsurpassed by any other kind of mind, yet its orientation toward action and its scope will sharply differentiate it from that of "professional intellectuals". He and high-type political leaders will prove striking examples of a classical French remark about "the superior person": "He is not a specialists."

(4) A good administrator needs to be, up to a point, a good listener; beyond this point he needs to be a good initiator of that to which he listens. This is to say that he is one who asks searching questions, the answers to which will importantly illumine the problem before him,

and illumine it in terms of his peculiar responsibilities.

Even the ablest of subordinates tends to discuss a problem in terms of his own involvement in it. The administrator next higher should not deal with it only in terms of the subordinate's concerns. He listens in part to get the subordinate's view, of course. In another part he listens in order to identify things *not* said which may be crucial to *his* responsibility; he needs then to inquire about these matters. His questions will reflect his exposure to larger parts of his organization than any particular subordinate regularly deals with. They will reflect also his exposure to larger publics and correspondingly significant worldly wisdom.

The subordinate's view, in contrast, will be confined to narrower, more specialized functions. The subordinate is likely to lose some of his bearings because of his preoccupations with techniques or other particulars. The good administrator is one whose questions turn attention back to the organization's basic purposes as related to the particular matters under consideration.

(5) A good administrator is one who has learned how to be unusually effective with people.

He is skilled in avoiding personal offence, in seeing how to placate and when to offend, and persuade. This means that he has quick emotional perceptions. For this very reason he avoids membership in or reliance on cliques, and for the most part is in one sense merely impersonal and fair toward individuals, yet in another sense he is considerate, loyal and defensive of colleagues and subordinates. This is to say that he has no favourites, no cronies, but is quick to see and respond to special opportunities to be helpful.

(6) A kindred point is that a good administrator is one who prefers to have around him the ablest people he can find. He builds his own strength by building the competence of his organization—not by demonstrating how he can tower above incompetents. He praises good performance in preference to offering criticism of mistakes. If criticism is really called for, it is offered privately and as inoffensively as possible.

(7) It is only a step to the next point. A good administrator uses *his institutional resources*, rather than relying too heavily on himself. The organization as a whole can produce a vast amount of information that will be importantly useful

to him. It can offer many ideas, and many judgements, the fruits of many kinds of experience. It can and will do more of these things if he exhibits great hospitality to ideas, information and judgement.

(8) A good administrator is one who aims at effectiveness and avoids using power or authority for their own sake. Using them readily when his responsibility requires, he will usually keep power in reserve, available for the exceptional case. He will prefer to avoid issuing "orders" in favour of ratifying subordinate proposals, stimulating the unauthored groups' conclusion, or suggesting courses of action. He will especially avoid making decisions others should make and equally avoid making decisions before they are needed. Thus, often his decision will be not to decide but to postpone action, to refer the problem to others, even though when a personal decision is required he will make it promptly and without intentional ambiguity. For decisions made individually and for those made by subordinates alike, he will assume definite responsibility.

(9) A good administrator has self-confidence that enables him readily to confess ignorance and personal fault. The incompetent adminis-

trator gets himself into frequent trouble by pretending to knowledge he doesn't have and by trying to justify his own least justifiable actions.

(10) The good administrator does not discourage, but positively welcomes, reports of troublesome things lest they reach unmanageable dimensions before he hears of them. He passes on reports of such matters to higher authority in terms varying according to the nature of the difficulty but he is especially careful to report factually on things that may seem to reflect shortcomings on his own part. Nothing else helps so much to earn the confidence of his own superiors and his subordinates. Weaker, less competent administrators paint a too-rosy picture of themselves and use subordinates as scapegoats. Others easily see their weakness.

In reporting trouble, the administrator makes clear in certain instances that it is for information only, with no action then recommended or desired. In cases where action is due, he reports the problem and reports his own remedial action, or presents possible alternative actions and indicates which one seems to him to be preferable. In other words, he avoids both panic and unwarranted non-chalance, avoids merely spreading gloom, carries his full share of responsibility,

and assumes responsibility for assisting his superiors find problem solutions.

(11) A good administrator is a team-worker. He deals with "subordinates" in a manner showing them the same kind of respect he gives to his "superiors". They are all important to each other. He is considerate of others, but never "soft" and never gullible; he is a hard task-master, but a fair one. He upholds subordinate responsibilities exactly as he wishes his own to be upheld.

(12) A good administrator tirelessly pursues means of improving administration of all for which he is responsible. He is hospitable to suggestions for improvement. He is *an initiator in asking new questions about performance* and about seeing new ways to appraise what is going on. While one of the duties of an administrator is to enforce conformity with established routines, in the interest of systematic and synchronized action, he also has a special responsibility for the improvement of work ways, and a working perspective especially fitting him for the task.

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Barnard has said, "The higher the positions

in the line of authority, the more general the abilities required." Yet the usual tendency will be for an executive to be the prisoner of his past, more limited, preoccupations. His "thirteen years of experience" may be only one year of experience repeated thirteen times. Getting out of prior experience what is significantly relevant to a position higher up or to a different functional situation is extremely difficult and uncommon, rather than something to be assumed because of present position.

Because institutions have vitality and momentum, high-ranking executives happily adjusted in an organization may not be notably competent. They may be passengers, carried on, perhaps unconsciously, by associates and the organization as a whole. Further promotion may be unwarranted, and transfer to some entirely different field of action may be the height of un wisdom. No one's equipment can automatically and commonly include experience in jobs not held, and ability to lead persons in those jobs the executive has not held is the prerequisite to his promotion or transfer.

A distinct step-up in achievement in one job after another; success in markedly different types of jobs in different institutions; revitali-

zing a deteriorating organization; success in starting and heading an entirely new organization where there is no special advantage in patents, size of capital resources or the like; and success in crisis—these, progressively in this order, are extraordinarily convincing of an executive's virtuosity. But all of these elements of proof are only rarely available.

Many administrators in private organizations would be disposed to insist that almost everything said up to now in this discussion applies as much to private administration as to public administration. Except in terms of degree of application this is true in private organizations conducted within nations which have well-established political democracy. In other words, as government increases *its* democratic character it exercises—for the most part indirectly—an influence complicating and humanizing private administration. Political democracy changes popular attitudes towards private administrative practices, changes mass expectations, and gradually strengthens the bargaining position of employees in relation to employers.

To see this we have only to recall the pictures Dickens gave us of life in England as experienced by the masses only a century or so ago. English

people at that time had a few basic—and until then most unusual—political rights, but they were not yet living under a government that was “a well-established political democracy”. Both feudal attitudes and royal powers were still strong. Even if technologies had been more advanced than they were, and total income of the society thus made sufficient to elevate mass standards significantly, it is likely that most of the gains would have gone then to the already privileged. It was a period when the almost unchallenged economic rationalization was that of *laissez-faire*. This was the ruthless and arbitrary reality that Mark saw, and the advance of technology alone would not so soon or certainly have refuted him as did that advance coupled with the strengthening of political democracy.

The United States was somewhat sooner committed to truly popular sovereignty, but until the ideal of “republican” government evolved into a more thoroughly and frankly democratic form, private administration in my country in retrospect is seen to have been shockingly ruthless. In my lifetime I have seen enormous changes in the private scene.

Most injections of compassion and the manners

and methods conducive to good morale have come as *indirect* consequence of aspirations specifically served by governmental and political processes. Private organizations have responded to changed expectations of employees and clients in manifold, subtle ways. But they have also responded to particular standards written into law and imposed upon them by a government popularly responsive because it was popularly responsible. They have acted also in concern lest failure to act would lead to further governmental regulation or intervention.

The callousness with which industrialists still exploited child labour at the turn of the century has given way to universal school attendance to the age of about 16, school lunches and a host of other welfare programmes. Employer liability for injuries of employees, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, in-service training and establishment of collective bargaining are only a few of the items now achieving equities almost undreamed of century ago. These things mean that the modern definition of a "good administrator" in private institutions has come to have considerable humane and social content.

R. A. Gordon's study of *Leadership in Large*

Corporations in the United States makes vivid the fact that corporate goals have become so numerous in the most thoroughly "capitalistic" nation, and involve so many values other than profits, that corporation executives nowadays are highly confused. Their concerns are greatly affected by employee, community and public attitudes. Even so, private responsibilities and involvements are, and will ever be, much more narrowly confined than those of government.

Therefore, the qualities generally distinguishing good administrators as I have listed them in the earlier part of this discussion seriously understate the requirements for public administrators. Everything required of competent private administrators is needed in public administrators in still larger terms.

No one may be confidently expected to be an able public administrator merely because he has a reputation as a private administrator. Most of the dismal failures I have seen in public posts were appointed to them because of their reputations as private administrators. These few who made the shift successfully had had more than an ordinary amount of prior association with things and people governmental. Even so, all of these few were startled and shocked to find how very

much of their time and energies had to be expended in dealings direct or indirect with legislatures, executive colleagues, governors and citizen groups engaged in agitation.

This is implicit in democracy. The basic principles and structures of democracy probably cannot, and probably should not, be fully utilized in large and important private organizations. (Sidney and Beatrice Webb, socialist thinkers, saw part of the problem when they asserted that members of cooperatives should lose their votes when employed by them.) In any case, the public scope is wider and more complicated than the scope of any private responsibility. A good administrator in a democratic government post, therefore, is one who—beyond the qualifications I have emphasized earlier—needs to have a high respect and sympathy for political processes and political leaders. Lack in this area is widespread, and it is one of the most serious of all possible shortcomings, for it is the scope of politics that differentiates democracy from all other governmental forms.

There are no strong drives characteristic of human beings which democratic government can fail to take into account. This is why the problems dealt with by government exceed the

capacity of sheer intellect or of skills merely technical. The craftsmanship of democratic government is essentially a *social* skill.

The career, "non-political" public servant may be socially skilful with his fellow workers, but even with them he is preoccupied with a special responsibility that is much less than commensurate with the general society or the general public interest. For society at large and for the general public interest there are no brokers so skilful, so widely exposed, so accountable as the party politicians. While internal competition and coordination will enable the bureaucracy to overcome the worst excesses of their preoccupations, this is sufficiently accomplished only under the discipline of control by politicians through the medium of party responsibility. This discipline is handicapped at the national level in India because of ministerial and parliamentary remoteness from the actual interchange between administrative organs and citizens. This remoteness results from the extraordinary way in which administration of programmes crucial to *national* policy is assigned to *states*.

The good administrator—politician or civil servant—does not try to "act like a politician"

or to "act like a good administrator". Real political performance and good administration are not to be seen in plays on stage or screen; they can only be stimulated there. The true politician behaves in a political way because he *is* a politician. The good administrator acts with competence because he *is* a good administrator. (How the two got that way and are continuing to get that way is another story.) One can only be one's self. But no one can be a really top-quality administrator in democratic government without having respect for political processes and political responsibilities.

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It may be permissible for me, finally, to make what I think an important sub-point under points 7 and 12 in the summary list with which I began this discussion. Point 7 stressed the ability to utilize institutional resources. Point 12 listed the pursuit of administrative improvement. A basic improvement is the creation, in the light of experience and in view of new goals and work-load increments, of more effective institutional structures and processes.

Structural changes should usually be arrived

at in an orderly and evolutionary fashion, but in the context of a general continuity sometimes some drastic changes of an important sort become necessary.

I illustrate by speaking of India although I believe what I say has equal significance in every nation seeking rapid advancement.

The first administrative necessity for independent and socially revolutionary India was to utilize the best available institutional substructure. That was clearly and emphatically the Indian remnant of the Indian Civil Service and its associate and subordinate services. I should like to testify, too, that in my judgement the *best* of the individuals comprising this institutional facility were and are the equals of the best in any other nation, with the *average* in responsible positions generally rating also very high.

This long after independence, however, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of old structures and workways as well as the enormously increased dimensions and changed character of the programmatic work-load here.

The basic institutional pattern of administration here still has many distinctly British features. Much of all this contributed signifi-

cantly to the generally high quality of the Indian government. But for present needs structural and procedural changes, and many changes in attitude, are certainly in order.

I agree with the relevant point, if not entirely with the supporting argument made here recently by an American colleague. He said that if the British had been as able administrators as many have thought them to be neither India nor the United States would be independent nations today. This is more persuasive in the case of the United States than in the case of India. Concerning India, granted that the United States had in fact started the procession to independence, I doubt that better administration could have done any better than in the end to make the noble exit the British did make, and enlist India as a highly important member of the Commonwealth as it did.

The general point, however, is that the British pattern of administration, even at home, needs change in a changing world, and its pattern of administration in India needs more rapid and extensive change than has yet been achieved.

A part of the past success and eminence of British administration was a product of military competence and naval supremacy, and another

part derived from a feudal history and the consequent fact that British diplomats and administrators, at home and in other countries with strong feudal traditions, spoke in the traditional voice, of authority. Success so achieved won further success, of course.

There was more to it, of course. The British, like the Persians and the Romans in other long-enduring empires, in the last century confined colonial power to its essentials and enlisted local leaders in their hierarchies. Their administration of law was in some respects harsh, but there was in it a respect for fair process that was impressive.

For a wide variety of reasons, only some of them "administrative", Britain has a deserved eminence. It is now as for a long time distinguished by persons of high abilities, a social and political spirit, cohesion and political adaptability that reflect extraordinary maturity and argue for the nation's long survival.

Yet British administration has changed significantly in the quarter-century I have known it. And changing internal social conditions foreshadow and require further change. Anyhow, a system British-designed cannot at all be expected to serve the growing needs of indepen-

dent India as well as system designed by Indians and imaginatively and continually developed by them.

A foreigner may be permitted in so friendly a country to suggest that the original transition has been so well made that the time has come for administrators in India to demonstrate in special measure one of the important capacities of good administrators—the capacity to improve institutional structures and work-ways. This requires knowledge of structural variations in various kinds of effective institutions and considerable understanding of factors contributing to effectiveness and popular accountability, all pointed first of all at insuring *national* success, *national* capacity to subordinate and coordinate local egoisms and specialist egoisms. Unification of many of the special “services” here into a major general civil service would be, in my opinion, one convincing and important demonstration.


Coming when they came, and in the form in which they came, the constitutional commitments made by the new Indian nation are heavier than those ever undertaken elsewhere. Anywhere such principles and goals might have been established even so recently as 1920,

their exactions of administrators would have been unprecedented. Today they are staggering. The improvements in administration that are needed would be impossibly difficult if they were carried on in the spirit of programmatic "detachment" so often invoked on behalf of civil service irresponsibility. There is no such thing as a "good administrator" who has no deep sense of emotional involvement in the *programmes* adopted by the government. In India there is no such thing as a good administrator who is not thoroughly *attached* to the Welfare State commitments to which the national Constitution binds all who claim to be public administrators.

The heart of administration is the management of programmes designed to serve the general welfare. The people do not look to governments to conduct civil service examinations, carry on budgets and other such things often erroneously referred to as "the administrative". These things are incidental to administration. The people look to governments to carry on programmes of general benefit and it is the conduct of these programmes that is the proper focus of administration. *A good administrator is programme-oriented.* The higher he goes,

the more programmes he has to take into account, give himself to, and at the same time restrict and balance in terms of each other and in terms of resources available to use in them. But for him, the results to which his every action is dedicated are results of popular value.

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